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Abstract—In recent years, coverage-based greybox fuzzing has
proven itself to be one of the most effective techniques for finding
security bugs in practice. Particularly, American Fuzzy Lop (AFL
for short) is deemed to be a great success in fuzzing relatively sim-
ple test inputs. Unfortunately, when it meets structured test inputs
such as XML and JavaScript, those grammar-blind trimming and
mutation strategies in AFL hinder the effectiveness and efficiency.
To this end, we propose a grammar-aware coverage-based grey-
box fuzzing approach to fuzz programs that process structured in-
puts. Given the grammar (which is often publicly available) of test
inputs, we introduce a grammar-aware trimming strategy to trim
test inputs at the tree level using the abstract syntax trees (ASTs)
of parsed test inputs. Further, we introduce two grammar-aware
mutation strategies (i.e., enhanced dictionary-based mutation and
tree-based mutation). Specifically, tree-based mutation works via
replacing subtrees using the ASTs of parsed test inputs. Equipped
with grammar-awareness, our approach can carry the fuzzing ex-
ploration into width and depth.
We implemented our approach as an extension to AFL, named
Superion; and evaluated the effectiveness of Superion on real-life
large-scale programs (a XML engine libplist and three JavaScript
engines WebKit, Jerryscript and ChakraCore). Our results have
demonstrated that Superion can improve the code coverage (i.e.,
16.7% and 8.8% in line and function coverage) and bug-finding
capability (i.e., 31 new bugs, among which we discovered 21 new
vulnerabilities with 16 CVEs assigned and 3.2K USD bug bounty
rewards received) over AFL and jsfunfuzz. We also demonstrated
the effectiveness of our grammar-aware trimming and mutation.
Index Terms—Greybox Fuzzing, Structured Inputs, ASTs
I. INTRODUCTION
Fuzzing or fuzz testing is an automated software testing tech-
nique to feed a large amount of invalid or unexpected test inputs
to a target program in the hope of triggering unintended pro-
gram behaviors, e.g., assertion failures, crashes, or hangs. Since
its introduction in early 1990s [45], fuzzing has become one of
the most effective techniques for finding bugs or vulnerabilities
in real-world programs. It has been successfully applied to test-
ing various applications, ranging from rendering engines and
image processors to compilers and interpreters.
A fuzzer can be classified as generation-based (e.g., [33, 62,
64, 69]) or mutation-based (e.g., [9, 42, 54, 58]), depending on
whether test inputs are generated by the knowledge of the input
format or grammar or by modifying well-formed test inputs. A
fuzzer can also be classified as whitebox (e.g., [26, 52]), grey-
box (e.g., [9, 42]) or blackbox (e.g., [45, 66]), depending on the
degree of leveraging a target program’s internal structure, which
reflects the tradeoffs between effectiveness and efficiency. In
this paper, we focus on mutation-based greybox fuzzing.
Coverage-Based Greybox Fuzzing. One of the most suc-
cessful mutation-based greybox fuzzing techniques is coverage-
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Fig. 1: The General Workflow of AFL
based greybox fuzzing, which uses the coverage information of
each executed test input to determine the test inputs that should
be retained for further incremental fuzzing. AFL [71] is a state-
of-the-art coverage-based greybox fuzzer, which has discovered
thousands of high-profile vulnerabilities. Thus, without the loss
of generality, we consider AFL as the typical implementation of
coverage-based greybox fuzzing.
As shown in Fig. 1, AFL takes the target program as an input,
and works in two steps: instrumenting the target program and
fuzzing the instrumented program. The instrumentation step in-
jects code at branch points to capture branch (edge) coverage
together with branch hit counts (which are bucketized to small
powers of two). A test input is said to have new coverage if it
either hits a new branch, or achieves a new hit count for an
already-exercised branch. The fuzzing step can be broken down
into five sub-steps. Specifically, a test input is first selected from
a queue where the initial test inputs as well as the test inputs that
have new coverage are stored. Then the test input is trimmed to
the smallest size that does not change the measured behavior of
the program, as the size of test inputs has a dramatic impact on
the fuzzing efficiency. The trimmed test input is then mutated to
generate new test inputs; and the program is executed with
respect to each mutated test input. Finally, the queue is updated
by adding those mutated test inputs to the queue if they achieve
new coverage, while the mutated test inputs that achieve no new
coverage are discarded. This fuzzing loop continues by selecting
a new test input from the queue.
Challenges. The current coverage-based greybox fuzzers can
effectively fuzz programs that process compact and unstructured
inputs (e.g., images). However, some challenges arise when they
are used to target programs that process structured inputs (e.g.,
XML and JavaScript) that often follow specific grammars. Such
programs often process the inputs in stages, i.e., syntax parsing,
semantic checking, and application execution [64].
On one hand, the trimming strategies (e.g., removal of chunks
of data) in AFL are grammar-blind, and hence can easily violate
the grammar or destroy the input structure. As a result, most test
inputs in the queue cannot be effectively trimmed to keep them
syntax-valid. This is especially the case when the target program
can process a part of a test input (triggering coverage) but errors
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Fig. 2: The General Workflow of Superion with the Highlighted
Differences from AFL (see Fig. 1)
out on the remaining part. This will greatly affect the efficiency
of AFL because it needs to spend more time on fuzzing the test
inputs whose structures are destroyed, but only finds parsing
errors and gets stuck at the syntax parsing stage, which heavily
limits the capability of fuzzers in finding deep bugs.
On the other hand, the mutation strategies (e.g., bit flipping)
in AFL are grammar-blind, and hence most of the mutated test
inputs fail to pass syntax parsing and are rejected at an early
stage of processing. As a result, it is difficult for AFL to achieve
large-step mutations. For example, it is very difficult to obtain
Content-Length: -1 from mutating Set-Cookie: FOO=BAR via
small-step bit flipping mutations [70]. Meanwhile, AFL needs
to spend a large amount of time struggling with syntax cor-
rectness, while only finding parsing errors. Therefore, the
effectiveness of AFL to find deep bugs is heavily limited for
programs that process structured inputs.
The Proposed Approach. To address the challenges, we pro-
pose a new grammar-aware coverage-based greybox fuzzing ap-
proach for programs that process structured inputs. We also im-
plement the proposed approach as an extension to AFL, named
Superion1. Our approach takes as inputs a target program and a
grammar of the test inputs that is often publicly available. Based
on the grammar, we parse each test input into an abstract syntax
tree (AST). Using ASTs, we introduce a grammar-aware trim-
ming strategy that can effectively trim test inputs while keeping
the input structure valid. This is realized by iteratively removing
each subtree in the AST of a test input and observing coverage
differences. Moreover, we propose two grammar-aware muta-
tion strategies that can quickly carry the fuzzing exploration be-
yond syntax parsing. We first enhance AFL’s dictionary-based
mutation strategy by inserting/overwriting tokens in a grammar-
aware manner, and then propose a tree-based mutation strategy
that replaces one subtree in the AST of a test input with the
subtree from itself or another test input in the queue.
To evaluate the effectiveness of Superion, we conducted ex-
periments on one XML engine libplist and three JavaScript en-
gines WebKit, Jerryscript and ChakraCore. We compared our
approach with AFL with respect to the code coverage and bug-
finding capability. The results have demonstrated that Superion
can effectively improve the code coverage over AFL by 16.7%
in line coverage and 8.8% in function coverage; and Superion
can significantly improve the bug-finding capability over AFL
by finding 31 new bugs (among which six were found by AFL).
1Superion is an Autobot combiners in the cartoon The Transformers.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>Some ASCII string</key>
<string></string>
<data>
</data>
</dict>
</plist>
Fig. 3: An Example of AFL’s Built-In Trimming
Among these bugs, 21 new vulnerabilities were discovered with
16 CVEs assigned; and we received 3.2K USD bug bounty
rewards. Besides, we compared Superion with jsfunfuzz [56],
which is a successful fuzzer specifically designed for JavaScript.
However, it failed to find any new bugs. Moreover, we have
demonstrated that our grammar-aware trimming strategy can
effectively trim test inputs while keeping them syntax-valid; and
our grammar-aware mutation strategies can effectively generate
new test inputs that can trigger new coverage.
Contributions. The contributions of this work are:
• We proposed a novel grammar-aware coverage-based greybox
fuzzing approach for programs that process structured inputs,
which complements existing coverage-based greybox fuzzers.
• We implemented our approach and made it open-source2, and
conducted experiments to demonstrate its effectiveness.
• We found 31 new bugs, among which we found 21 new vul-
nerabilities with 16 CVEs assigned and received 3.2K USD
bug bounty rewards.
II. OUR APPROACH
To address the challenges of coverage-based greybox fuzzing
(Section I), we propose a novel grammar-aware coverage-based
greybox fuzzing approach, which targets programs that process
structured inputs. We implement the approach as an extension to
AFL [71], named Superion. Fig. 2 introduces the workflow of
Superion, and highlights the differences from AFL (see Fig. 1).
In particular, a context-free grammar of the test inputs is needed,
which is often publicly available (e.g., in ANTLR’s community
[1]). We introduce a grammar-aware trimming strategy (Section
II-A) and two grammar-aware mutation strategies (Section II-B)
with the purpose of making AFL grammar-aware.
A. Grammar-Aware Trimming Strategy
The built-in trimming strategy in AFL is grammar-blind, and
treats a test input as chunks of data. Basically, it first divides the
test input to be trimmed into chunks of len/n bytes where
len is the length of the test inputs in bytes, and then tries to
remove each chunk sequentially. If the coverage remains the
same after the removal of a chunk, this chunk is trimmed. Note
that n starts at 16 and increments by a power of two up to 1024.
This strategy is very effective for unstructured inputs. However,
it cannot effectively prune structured inputs while keeping them
syntax-valid, possibly making AFL stuck in the fuzzing explo-
ration of syntax parsing without finding deep bugs.
Example. Fig. 3 gives an example of AFL’s built-in trimming
on an XML test input with respect to libplist (an XML engine),
where “l versio” and “dict> </plis” are trimmed (highlighted
2https://github.com/zhunki/gramFuzz
Algorithm 1 Grammar-Aware Trimming
Input: the test input to be trimmed in, the grammar G
Output: the trimmed test input ret
1: while true do
2: parse in according to G into an AST tree
3: if there are any parsing errors then
4: return built-in-trimming (in)
5: end if
6: for each subtree n in tree do
7: ret = remove n from tree
8: run the target program against ret
9: if coverage remains the same then
10: in = ret
11: break
12: else
13: add n back to tree
14: end if
15: if n is the last subtree in tree then
16: return ret
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
...
try{eval("M:if(([15,16,17,18].some(this.unwatch(\"x\"),(([window if([[]])])[this.
prototype])))) else{true;return null;}");} catch(ex){}
try{eval("M:while((null >=\"\")&&0){/a/gi}");} catch(ex){}
try{eval("\nbreak M;\n");} catch(ex){}
try{eval("L:if((window[(1.2e3.x::y)]).x) return null; else if((uneval(window))++.
propertyIsEnumerable(\"x\")){CollectGarbage()}");} catch(ex){}
try{eval("/*for..in*/for(var x in ((({}).hasOwnProperty
)([,,].hasOwnProperty(\"x\"))))/*for..in*/ M:for(var
[window, y] =(-1) in this) [1,2,3,4].slice");} catch
(ex){}
try{eval("if(\"\"){}else if(x4) {null;}");} catch(ex){}
try{eval("{}");} catch(ex){}
try{eval("for(var x = x in x - /x/ ){}");} catch(ex){}
try{eval("if((uneval(x, x))) var x = false; else if((null\n.unwatch(\"x\"))) throw
window; else {} return 3;");}catch(ex){}
...
Fig. 4: An Example of Grammar-Aware Trimming
by strikethrough). The trimmed test input is syntax-invalid, but
has the same coverage with the original test input due to the gap
between implementation of libplist and grammar specification.
Hence, the trimmed test input is used for further fuzzing even
though its grammar is destroyed by AFL’s built-in trimming.
To ensure the syntax-validity of trimmed test inputs, we pro-
pose a grammar-aware trimming strategy, whose procedure is
given in Algorithm 1. It first parses the test input to be trimmed
in according to the grammar G into an AST tree (Line 2). If
any parsing errors occur (as in’s structure may be destroyed by
mutations), then it uses AFL’s built-in trimming strategy rather
than directly discarding it (Line 3–5); otherwise, it attempts to
trim a subtree n from tree (Line 6–7). If the coverage is differ-
ent after n is trimmed, then n cannot be trimmed (Line 12–14),
and it tries to trim next subtree; otherwise, n is trimmed, and it
re-parses the remaining test input (Line 9–11), and then repeats
the procedure until no subtree can be trimmed (Line 15–16).
Thus, we resort to AFL’s built-in trimming only when our tree-
based trimming is not applicable. This is because sometimes
invalidity is also useful.
Example. Fig. 4 shows an example of our trimming strategy
on a JavaScript test input, where a complete try-catch state-
ment (highlighted by strikethrough) is trimmed without intro-
ducing any coverage differences. However, it is almost im-
possible for AFL’s built-in trimming strategy to prune such a
complete statement.
Algorithm 2 Dictionary-Based Mutation
Input: the test input in, the dictionary D
Output: the set of mutated test inputs T
1: T = ∅
2: l = the length of in
3: for i = 0; i < l; do
4: j = i+ 1
5: curr = *(u8*)(in’s address + i) // current byte of in
6: next = *(u8*)(in’s address + j) // next byte of in
7: while j < l && curr and next are alphabet or digit do
8: j = j + 1
9: next = *(u8*)(in’s address + j)
10: end while
11: for each token d in D do
12: insert d at i of in / overwrite i to j of in with d
13: T = T ∪ {in}
14: end for
15: i = j
16: end for
overwrite
insert
…
a = 0x1;
a = 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a = 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a + 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
const a = 01;
…
(a) Original (b) Enhanced
…
a = 0x1;
a = 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a = 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a = 0+;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a = 0const1;
…
overwrite
insert
(a) Original
overwrite
insert
…
a = 0x1;
a = 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a = 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a + 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
const a = 01;
…
(a) Original (b) Enhanced
…
a = 0x1;
a = 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a = 01;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a = 0+;
…
…
a = 0x1;
a = 0const1;
…
overwrite
insert
(b) Enhanced
Fig. 5: An Example of Dictionary-Based Mutation
B. Grammar-Aware Mutation Strategies
The default mutation strategies (e.g., bit flipping or token in-
sertion) in AFL are too fine-grained and grammar-blind to keep
the input structure following the underlying grammar. Therefore,
we propose two grammar-aware mutation strategies to improve
the mutation effectiveness on triggering new program behaviors.
1) Enhanced Dictionary-Based Mutation: Dictionary-based
mutation [70] was introduced to make up for the grammar-blind
nature of AFL. The dictionary is referred as a list of basic syntax
tokens (e.g., reserved keywords) which can be provided by users
or automatically identified by AFL. Every token is inserted be-
tween every two bytes of the test input to be mutated, or written
over every byte sequence of the same length of the token. Such
mutations can generate syntax-valid test inputs but is inefficient
as most of the generated inputs have destroyed structure.
Therefore, we propose the enhanced dictionary-based muta-
tion as shown in Algorithm 2. This algorithm leverages the key
fact that the tokens (e.g., variable names, function names, or re-
served keywords) in a structured test input normally only con-
sist of alphabets or digits. Hence, it first locates the token bound-
aries in a test input by iteratively checking whether the current
and next byte are both alphabet or digit (Line 3–10). Then it
inserts each token in the dictionary to each located boundary,
which avoids the insertion between consecutive sequence of
alphabets and digits and thus greatly decreases the number of
token insertions (Line 11–14). Similarly, it writes each token
in the dictionary over the content between every two located
boundaries, which also greatly decreases the number of token
overwrites. Such token insertions and overwrites not only
maintains the structure of mutated test inputs but also decreases
the number of mutated test inputs, hence greatly improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of dictionary-based mutation.
Example. Fig. 5 illustrates the difference between the origi-
nal and enhanced dictionary-based mutation. In the original one,
01 is not treated as a whole, and thus 1 can be overwritten by
+ and const can be inserted between 0 and 1, which destroys
the structure without introducing any new coverage. In the en-
hanced one, 01 is identified as a whole, and hence the mutated
test inputs in Fig. 5a will not be produced. Instead, it can gen-
erate the mutated test inputs in Fig. 5b more efficiently, which
are taken from our experiments and both lead to new coverage.
2) Tree-Based Mutation: Dictionary-based mutation is aware
of the underlying grammar in an implicit way. To be explicitly
aware of the grammar and thus producing syntax-valid test in-
puts, we utilize the grammar knowledge and design a tree-based
mutation, which works at the level of ASTs. Different from the
tokens used in dictionary-based mutation, AST actually models
a test input as objects with named properties, and is designed to
represent all the information about a test input. Thus, ASTs pro-
vide a suitable granularity for a fuzzer to mutate test inputs.
Algorithm 3 shows the procedure of our tree-based mutation.
It takes as inputs a test input tar to be mutated, the grammar G,
and a test input pro that is randomly chosen from the queue. It
first parses tar according to G into an AST tar tree; and if
any parsing errors occur, tar is a syntax-invalid test input and
we do not apply tree-based mutation to tar (Line 3–6). If no
error occurs, it traverses tar tree, and stores each subtree in a
set S (Line 7–9). Then it parses pro into an AST pro tree, and
stores each subtree of pro tree in S if there is no parsing error
(Line 10–15). Here S serves as the content provider of mutation.
Then, for each subtree n in tar tree, it replaces n with each of
the subtree s in S to generate a new mutated test input (Line 16–
21). Finally, it returns the set of mutated test inputs.
The size of this returned set can be the multiplication of the
number of subtrees in tar tree and the number of subtrees in
tar tree and pro tree, which could be very large. As an exam-
ple, our tree-based mutation on tar and pro whose number of
subtrees is respectively 100 and 500 will generate 100× (100+
500) = 60, 000 test inputs. This will add burden to the program
execution step during fuzzing, making fuzzing less efficient. To
relieve the burden, we design three heuristics to reduce the num-
ber of mutated test inputs. For clarity, we do not elaborate these
heuristics in Algorithm 3, but only show where they are applied.
• Heuristic 1: Restricting the size of test inputs. We limit the
size of test inputs (i.e., tar and pro in Algorithm 3) as 10,000
bytes long (Line 3 and 10). Hence we do not apply tree-based
mutation to tar if tar is more than 10,000 bytes long; and we
do not use subtrees of pro as the content provider of mutation
if pro is more than 10,000 bytes long. The reasons are that, a
larger test input usually needs a larger number of mutations;
more memory is required to store the AST of a larger test in-
put; and a larger test input often has a slower execution speed.
• Heuristic 2: Restricting the number of mutations. If there
are more than 10,000 subtrees in tar and pro, we randomly
select 10,000 from all subtrees in S as the content provider of
mutation (Line 16). Thus, we keep the number of mutations
on each test input in the queue under 10,000 to make sure that
each test input in the queue has the chance to get mutated.
Algorithm 3 Tree-Based Mutation
Input: the test input tar, the grammar G, the test input pro
Output: the set of mutated test inputs T
1: T = ∅
2: S = ∅ // the set of subtrees in tar and pro
3: parse tar according to G into an AST tar tree // Heuristic 1
4: if there are any parsing errors then
5: return
6: end if
7: for each subtree n in tar tree do // Heuristic 3
8: S = S ∪ {n}
9: end for
10: parse pro according to G into an AST pro tree // Heuristic 1
11: if there is no parsing error then
12: for each subtree n in pro tree do // Heuristic 3
13: S = S ∪ {n}
14: end for
15: end if
16: for each subtree n in tar tree do // Heuristic 2
17: for each subtree s in S do
18: ret = replace n in tar tree’s copy with s
19: T = T ∪ {ret}
20: end for
21: end for
22: return T
TABLE I: Target Languages and Their Structure and Samples
Language # Symbols Structure Level # Samples
XML 8 Weak 9,467 (534)
JavaScript 98 Strong 20,845 (2,569)
• Heuristic 3: Restricting the size of subtrees. We limit the
size of subtrees (i.e., each subtree in S in Algorithm 3) as 200
bytes long (Line 7 and 12). Thus we do not use the subtrees of
tar and pro as the content provider of mutation if the subtree
is more than 200 bytes long. Notice that 200 bytes are long
enough to include complex statements.
The threshold values in these heuristics were empirically
established as good ones.
Example. Fig. 6 shows an example of our tree-based muta-
tion. The left-side is the AST of the test input to be mutated (i.e.,
tar in Algorithm 3), and the right-side is the AST of the test in-
put that provides the content of mutation (i.e., pro in Algorithm
3). Here the subtree corresponding to the expression x+2 in tar
is replaced with the subtree corresponding to the expression
Number(x) in pro, resulting in a new test input.
III. EVALUATION
We implemented Superion in 3,372 lines of C/C++ code by
extending AFL [71]. Particularly, given the grammar of test in-
puts, we adopted ANTLR 4 [49] to generate the lexer and parser,
and used ANTLR 4 C++ runtime to parse test inputs and realize
our trimming and mutation strategies. Hence, our approach is
general and easily adoptable for other structured test inputs.
A. Evaluation Setup
To evaluate the effectiveness and generality of our approach,
we selected two target languages and four target programs, and
compared our approach with AFL [71] with respect to the bug-
finding capability and code coverage.
Target Languages. We chose XML and JavaScript as the tar-
get languages with different structure level. Their grammars are
all publicly available in ANTLR’s community [1]. In particular,
XML is a widely-used markup language, which defines a set of
var x=1;
var y=x+2;
program
sourceElements
sourceElement
=
initialiserx
variableDeclaration
variableDeclarationList
variableStatement
;
statement
<EOF>
var
singleExpression
litaral
numericLiteral
1
singleExpression +
x
sourceElement
=
initialisery
variableDeclaration
variableDeclarationList
variableStatement
;
statement
var
singleExpression
x=true;
Number(x);
program
sourceElements
sourceElement
true
singleExpression=
x
singleExpression
singleExpression
expressionSequence
expressionStatement
;
statement
sourceElement
x
singleExpression
argumentList
arguments
Number
singleExpression
<EOF>
statement
expressionStatement
expressionSequence ;
singleExpression
( )
var x=1;
var y=Number(x);
litaral
numericLiteral
2
AST AST
Mutation
Fig. 6: An Example of Tree-Based Mutation
rules for encoding documents. It has been widely used in a vari-
ety of applications. As shown in the second column of Table I,
the XML grammar only contains eight symbols. Thus, XML
can be considered to be weakly-structured. On the other hand,
JavaScript is an interpreted programming language, which is
employed by most websites and supported by all modern web
browsers. The JavaScript grammar contains 98 symbols, and
thus its structure level can be regarded as strong.
As indicated by the last column of Table I, we crawled 9,467
XML samples from the Internet, and 20,845 JavaScript samples
from the test inputs of the two open-source JavaScript engines
WebKit and Jerryscript. They were used as the initial test inputs
(i.e., seeds) for fuzzing. As suggested by AFL, afl-cmin should
be used to identify the set of functionally distinct seeds that
exercise different code paths in the target program when a large
amount of seeds are available. Therefore, we used afl-cmin on
the samples, and identified 534 and 2,569 distinct XML and
JavaScript samples as the seeds for fuzzing, as shown in the
parentheses in the last column of Table I. Notice that, before
fuzzing, we pre-processed the JavaScript samples by removing
all the comments as comments, especially multi-line comments,
account for a considerable percentage of waste of mutation.
Target Programs. We selected one open-source XML en-
gine libplist and three open-source JavaScript engines WebKit,
Jerryscript and ChakraCore as the programs for fuzzing. The
first four columns of Table II list the program details, including
the version, the number of lines of code, and the number of func-
tions. Particularly, libplist is a small portable C library to handle
Apple Property List format files in binary or XML. It is widely
used on iOS and Mac OS. WebKit is a cross-platform web
browser engine. It powers Safari, iBooks and App Store, and
various Mac OS, iOS and Linux applications. Jerryscript is a
lightweight JavaScript engine for Internet of Things, intended to
run on a very constrained devices. ChakraCore is the core part
of the Chakra Javascript engine that powers Microsoft Edge.
We chose these programs because they are security-critical and
widely-fuzzed. Thus, finding bugs in them are significant.
As shown in the fifth column of Table II, we used edge cover-
age for libplist and Jerryscript during fuzzing, but block cover-
TABLE II: Target Programs and Their Fuzzing Configuration
Program Version # Lines # Func. Coverage Timespan
libplist 1.12 3,317 316 Edge 3 months
WebKit 602.3.12 151,807 60,340 Block 3 months
Jerryscript 1.0 19,963 1,100 Edge 3 months
ChakraCore 1.10.1 236,881 74,132 Block 3 months
age for others due to non-determinism (i.e., different executions
of a test input lead to different coverage). Besides, we excluded
the non-deterministic code in WebKit and ChakraCore from
instrumentation, following the technique in kAFL [57].
At the time of writing, we have fuzzed these programs for
about three months. For libplist and Jerryscript, we have com-
pleted more than 100 cycles of fuzzing. For WebKit and Chakra-
Core, due to their large size, we have not finished one cycle
yet. Here a cycle means the fuzzer went over all the interesting
test inputs (triggering new coverage) discovered so far, fuzzed
them, and looped back to the very beginning.
Research Questions. Using the previous evaluation setup,
we aim to answer the following five research questions.
• RQ1: How is the bug-finding capability of Superion?
• RQ2: How is the code coverage of Superion?
• RQ3: How effective is our grammar-aware trimming?
• RQ4: How effective is our grammar-aware mutation?
• RQ5: What is the performance overhead of Superion?
We conducted all the experiments on machines with 28 Intel
Xeon CPU E5-2697v3 cores and 64GB memory, running 64-bit
Ubuntu 16.04 as the operating system.
B. Discovered Bugs and Vulnerabilities (RQ1)
Table III lists the unique bugs discovered in the four pro-
grams by Superion. In libplist, we discovered 11 new bugs, from
which we found 10 new vulnerabilities with CVE identifiers
assigned. In WebKit, 13 new bugs were found; and 6 of
them were vulnerabilities with 3 CVE identifiers assigned,
while others are pending for advisories. It is worth mention-
ing that these bugs obtained high appraisals, e.g., “This bug is
really interesting”, “Thank you for the awesome test case”
and “This bug has existed for a long time. A quick look
TABLE III: Unique Bugs Discovered by Superion
Program Bug Type AFL jsfunfuzz
libplist
CVE-2017-5545 Buffer Overflow 7 N/A
CVE-2017-5834 Buffer Overflow 3 N/A
CVE-2017-5835 Memory Corruption 3 N/A
CVE-2017-6435 Memory Corruption 7 N/A
CVE-2017-6436 Memory Corruption 7 N/A
CVE-2017-6437 Buffer Overflow 3 N/A
CVE-2017-6438 Buffer Overflow 3 N/A
CVE-2017-6439 Buffer Overflow 7 N/A
CVE-2017-6440 Memory Corruption 7 N/A
Bug-90 Assertion Failure 7 N/A
CVE-2017-7440 Integer Overflow 3 N/A
WebKit
CVE-2017-7095 Arbitrary Access 7 7
CVE-2017-7102 Arbitrary Access 7 7
CVE-2017-7107 Integer Overflow 7 7
Bug-188694 Buffer Overflow 7 7
Bug-188298 Use-After-Free 7 7
Bug-188917 Assertion Failure 7 7
Bug-170989 Assertion Failure 7 7
Bug-170990 Assertion Failure 7 7
Bug-172346 Null Pointer Deref 7 7
Bug-172957 Null Pointer Deref 7 7
Bug-172963 Buffer Overflow 7 7
Bug-173305 Assertion Failure 7 7
Bug-173819 Assertion Failure 7 7
Jerryscript
CVE-2017-18212 Buffer Overflow 7 N/A
CVE-2018-11418 Buffer Overflow 3 N/A
CVE-2018-11419 Buffer Overflow 7 N/A
Bug-2238 Buffer Overflow 7 N/A
ChakraCore
Bug-5534 Buffer Overflow 7 7
Bug-5533 Null Pointer Deref 7 7
Bug-5532 Null Pointer Deref 7 7
through blame would say for 4-5 years or so”. In Jerryscript,
we found 4 previously unknown bugs, from which we found 4
vulnerability with 3 CVE identifiers assigned. In ChakraCore,
we discovered 3 new bugs, and one of them is a vulnerability.
Note that we received 3.2K USD bug bounty rewards.
With respect to the type of these bugs (see the third column of
Table III), 12 of them are buffer overflow, 2 of them are integer
overflow, 4 of them are memory corruption, 2 of them are arbi-
trary address access, and 1 of them is use-after-free. These are
all vulnerabilities. Besides, 4 of them are null pointer derefer-
ence, and 6 of them are assertion failure. These are all denial
of service bugs. All these 31 bugs have been confirmed, and
25 of them have been fixed.
Comparison to AFL. Among these 31 bugs, AFL only dis-
covered six of them (as shown in the fourth column of Table III)
and did not discover any other new bugs. This demonstrates
that our approach significantly improves the bug finding capa-
bility of coverage-based grey-box fuzzers, which owes to the
grammar-awareness in Superion. Specifically, for relatively
weakly-structured inputs such as XML, AFL itself found 5
bugs, while Superion not only found all these 5 bugs, but also
found 6 more bugs than AFL. Differently, for highly-structured
inputs such as JavaScript, AFL barely found bugs. Only one bug
about utf-8 encoding problem was found by AFL in Jerryscript.
All other bugs in JavaScript engines were actually found by
Superion’s tree-based mutation. This further demonstrates the
significance of injecting grammar-awareness into coverage-
TABLE IV: Code Coverage of the Target Programs
Program
Line Coverage (%) Function Coverage (%)
Seeds AFL Superion Seeds AFL Superion
libplist 33.3 50.8 68.9 27.5 32.6 40.8
WebKit 52.4 56.0 78.0 35.1 37.0 49.5
Jerryscript 81.3 84.0 88.2 76.0 77.1 78.2
ChakraCore 46.7 54.5 76.9 40.7 49.8 63.2
based grey-box fuzzers.
Comparison to jsfunfuzz. We also compared Superion with
jsfunfuzz [56], which is a successful grammar-aware fuzzer
specifically designed for testing JavaScript engines. jsfunfuzz
can be used to fuzz WebKit and ChakraCore; but it fails to fuzz
Jerryscript because its generated JavaScript inputs have many
JavaScript features that are not supported by Jerryscript. After
three months of fuzzing, jsfunfuzz only found hundreds of out-
of-memory crashes in WebKit and ChakraCore, but failed to
find any bugs (as indicated by the last column of Table III). This
is because jsfunfuzz uses manually-specified rules to express
the grammar rules the generated inputs should satisfy. However,
it is daunting, or even impossible to manually express all the
required rules. Instead, Superion directly uses the grammar
automatically during trimming and mutation.
In summary, Superion can significantly improve the bug-
finding capability of coverage-based grey-box fuzzers (e.g.,
we found 31 new bugs, among which we discovered 21
new vulnerabilities with 16 CVE identifiers assigned).
C. Code Coverage (RQ2)
As empirically studied that 1% increase in code coverage can
increase the percentage of found bugs by 0.92% [12]. Hence,
apart from the bug-finding capability, we measured the code
coverage achieved by fuzzing. The results are shown in Table IV,
including the line and function coverage of the target programs.
In particular, we list the coverage achieved by initial seeds, AFL
and Superion. The coverage was calculated using afl-cov [53].
We were not able to calculate the coverage for jsfunfuzz due to
two reasons: jsfunfuzz does not keep the JavaScript samples
executed; and jsfunfuzz is verfy efficient and executes millions
of JavaScript samples until it triggers a crash, which makes
the coverage computation infeasible.
For line coverage, the initial seeds covered 33.3% lines of
libplist, 52.4% lines of WebKit, 81.3% lines of Jerryscript and
46.7% lines of ChakraCore. By fuzzing, AFL respectively in-
creased their line coverage to 50.8%, 56.0%, 84.0% and 54.5%.
On average, AFL further covered 7.9% of the code. Superion
improved the line coverage to 68.9%, 78.0%, 88.2% and 76.9%,
respectively; and it further covered 24.6% of the code on av-
erage. Overall, Superion outperformed AFL by 16.7% in line
coverage, because the grammar-awareness in Superion carries
the fuzzing exploration towards the application execution stage.
On the other hand, for function coverage, the initial seeds
covered 44.8% functions on average, and AFL and Superion in-
creased the function coverage to 49.1% and 57.9%, respectively.
Generally, Superion outperformed AFL by 8.8% in function
coverage due to its grammar-awareness.
TABLE V: Comparison Results of Trimming Strategies
Program
Trimming Ratio (%) Grammar Validity Ratio (%)
Built-In Tree-Based Built-In Tree-Based
libplist 21.7 11.7 74.1 100
WebKit 10.6 7.6 86.4 100
Jerryscript 5.1 4.7 89.3 100
ChakraCore 12.7 11.3 83.7 100
In summary, Superion can significantly improve the code
coverage of coverage-based grey-box fuzzers (e.g., 16.7%
in line coverage and 8.8% in function coverage).
D. Effectiveness of Grammar-Aware Trimming (RQ3)
Table V compares the trimming ratio (i.e., the ratio of bytes
trimmed from test inputs) and the grammar validity ratio (i.e.,
the ratio of test inputs that are grammar-valid after trimming)
using the built-in trimming in AFL and the tree-based trimming
in Superion. Numerically, for libplist, the built-in trimming in
AFL trimmed out 21.7% of bytes in XML test inputs on average,
while our tree-based trimming trimmed out 11.7% on average.
On the other hand, 74.1% of test inputs after the built-in trim-
ming were grammar-valid, but 100% of test inputs after our tree-
based trimming were grammar-valid and can be further used
to conduct our grammar-aware mutation.
Similarly, the built-in trimming respectively trimmed out
10.6%, 5.1% and 12.7% of bytes in JavaScript test inputs for
WebKit, Jerryscript and ChakraCore, while our tree-based trim-
ming respectively trimmed out 7.6%, 4.7% and 11.3% for We-
bKit, Jerryscript and ChakraCore. On the other hand, our tree-
based trimming increased the grammar validity ratio for We-
bKit, Jerryscript and ChakraCore from 86.4%, 89.3% and 83.7%
to 100%, which can facilitate our grammar-aware mutation by
improving the chance of applying grammar-aware mutation
(which is more effective in generating test inputs that can
trigger new coverage as will be discussed in Section III-E).
In summary, although with a relatively low trimming ratio,
our grammar-aware trimming strategy can significantly im-
prove the grammar validity ratio for the test inputs after
trimming, which facilitates our grammar-aware mutation.
E. Effectiveness of Grammar-Aware Mutation (RQ4)
To evaluate the effectiveness of our grammar-aware mutation
strategies, we compared them with those built-in mutation strate-
gies of AFL [73], which include bit flips (flip1/flip2/flip4 – one/t-
wo/four bit(s) flips), byte flips (flip8/flip16/flip32 – one/two/four
byte(s) flips), arithmetics (arith8/arith16/arith32 – subtracting
or adding small integers to 8-/16-/32-bit values), value overwrite
(interest8/interest16/interest32 – setting “interesting” 8-/16-/32-
bit values to 8-/16-/32-bit values), havoc (random application of
bit flips, byte flips, arithmetics, and value overwrite), and splice
(splicing together two random test inputs from the queue, and
then applying havoc). For the ease of presentation, our enhanced
dictionary-based mutation strategy is referred as ui (insertion of
user-supplied tokens), uo (overwrite with user-supplied tokens),
ai (insertion of automatically extracted tokens), and ao (over-
write with automatically extracted tokens); and our tree-based
mutation strategy is referred as tree.
Fig. 7 shows the number of interesting test inputs (i.e., trigger-
ing new coverage) discovered by different mutation strategies as
we fuzzed WebKit. For space limit, we omit the similar results
for libplist, Jerryscript and ChakraCore. The x-axis denotes the
number of test inputs that Superion sequentially took from the
queue and processed, and the y-axis denotes the corresponding
number of interesting test inputs produced by different mutation
strategies. As the process of different test inputs often takes dif-
ferent time, we do not use time to represent the x-axis. Besides,
for clarity, Fig. 7 omits the results when all the mutation strate-
gies become ineffective in continuously producing interesting
test inputs (i.e., when the curves in Fig. 7 change gently).
The results vary across different seeds. Even with seeds fixed,
the results may also vary across different runs due to the random
nature of some mutation strategies (i.e., havoc, splice and tree).
However, the trend remains the same across runs, and we only
discuss the trend which holds across runs. In the beginning, bit
and byte flips take a leading position in producing interesting
test inputs. The reasons are that i) bit and byte flips often
destroy the input structure, and trigger previously unseen error
handling paths; and ii) bit and byte flips are the first mutation
strategy to be sequentially applied, thus having the opportunity
to first trigger the new coverage that could also be triggered
by other mutation strategies. Gradually, the number of inter-
esting test inputs generated by our grammar-aware mutation
strategies outperform other mutation strategies. Specifically,
tree and uo significantly outperform other mutation strategies.
These results indicate that grammar-aware mutation strategies
are effective in producing interesting test inputs.
Besides, we also explore the efficiency of different mutation
strategies in producing interesting test inputs. The results are
shown in Fig. 8, where the x-axis is the same to Fig. 7 and the
y-axis denotes the ratio of interesting test inputs to the total
number of generated test inputs. Surprisingly, all the mutation
strategies are very inefficient in producing interesting test inputs,
i.e., only two of the 1000 mutated test inputs can trigger new
coverage. Thus, a huge amount of fuzzing efforts are wasted in
mutating and executed test inputs. Therefore, adaptive mutation
rather than exhaustive mutation should be designed to smartly
apply mutation strategies.
Moreover, to evaluate our enhancement to dictionary-based
mutation, we compared the dictionary overwrite and insertion in
AFL with those in Superion. The results are reported in Fig. 9,
where the x-axis is the same to Fig. 7, and the y-axis in Fig. 9a
and Fig. 9b represent the number of times each mutation is
applied and the number of interesting test inputs generated. We
can see that our enhanced dictionary-based mutation greatly
decreases the number of mutation applications by half, while
still generating significantly more interesting test inputs.
In summary, our grammar-aware mutation strategies are ef-
fective in generating test inputs that can trigger new cov-
erage, compared to the built-in mutation strategies in AFL.
However, the efficiency of all mutation strategies need to
be improved.
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Fig. 10: The Time to Read, Parse and Traverse Test Inputs with Respect to Different Size
TABLE VI: Performance Overhead on Target Programs
Program Tree-Based Mutation (ms) Execution (ms)
libplist 0.63 0.39
WebKit 5.65 12.50
Jerryscript 5.65 3.57
ChakraCore 5.65 20.00
F. Performance Overhead (RQ5)
The fuzzing process of a test input includes three major steps:
parsing, mutation and execution. Among them, the parsing step
is one-off for each test input, followed by a large number of
mutations and executions. In Fig. 10a and 10b, we show the
parsing time of JavaScript and XML test inputs in seconds (the
y-axis) with respect to the size of test input files in bytes (the x-
axis). Without loss of generality, we only report the results for
the initial test inputs (see the last column in Table I). In detail,
the parsing time includes the time to read, parse and traverse a
test input file. Generally, the parsing time is linearly correlated
to the size of test input files. Most of the JavaScript test inputs’
size is under 10 KB and their parsing time is under 10 seconds,
and the parsing time of XML test inputs is under 0.045 seconds.
Notice that the parser generated using ANLTR is not optimized
for the performance. We may reduce the execution time further
by improving the parser’s implementation.
Apart from the parsing time, the major performance overhead
Superion imposes on mutation and execution is caused by our
tree-based mutation. Table VI reports the overhead of applying
tree-based mutation (in the second column) as well as the cor-
responding overhead of executing the mutated test input (in the
third column). For small projects like libplist, it is very fast to
perform tree-based mutation and execution, i.e., the mutation
took 0.63 ms and the execution took 0.39 ms on average. For
large projects such as WebKit, Jerryscript and ChakraCore, the
execution took much more time; e.g., executing a JavaScript
input on ChakraCore took 20.00 ms, while the mutation took
5.65 ms on average. Considering the improvements to bug-
finding capability and code coverage, the performance overhead
introduced by Superion is acceptable.
In summary, Superion introduces additional overhead due
to our grammar-aware tree-based mutation strategy. How-
ever, such overhead is still acceptable considering the im-
proved bug-finding capability and code coverage.
G. Case Study
The JavaScript code fragment in Fig. 11 gives a representa-
tive test input that was generated by Superion and triggered an
integer overflow vulnerability in WebKit, assigned CVE-2017-
7xxx. In particular, this vulnerability is triggered because the
method setInput in class RegExpCachedResult forgets
to reify the leftContext and rightContext. As a result,
when later WebKit attempts to reify them, it will end up using
indices into an old input string to create a substring of a new
input string. For the test input in Fig. 11, WebKit tried to get
a substring through jsSubstring, whose length is 1 (i.e.,
length of “a”) - 2 (i.e., m_result.end of “ss”) = -1, as
var str="ss";
var re=str.replace(/\b\w+\b/g);
RegExp.input="a";
RegExp.rightContext;
Fig. 11: A Proof-of-Concept of CVE-2017-7xxx
JSString* RegExpCachedResult::rightContext(ExecState* exec, JSObject* owner)
{
// Make sure we’re reified.
lastResult(exec, owner);
if (!m_reifiedRightContext) {
unsigned length = m_reifiedInput->length();
m_reifiedRightContext.set(exec->vm(), owner, m_result.end != length ?
jsSubstring(exec, m_reifiedInput.get(), m_result.end, length - m_result.end)
: jsEmptyString(exec));
}
return m_reifiedRightContext.get();
}
Fig. 12: The Vulnerable Code Fragment for CVE-2017-7xxx
...
var str = "ss"
var re=str.replace(/\b\w+\b/g);
...
Fig. 13: Source Test Input to Trigger CVE-2017-7xxx
...
write(’RegExp.input: ’ + RegExp.input);
...
write(’RegExp.rightContext: ’ + RegExp.rightContext);
...
Fig. 14: Source Test Input to Trigger CVE-2017-7xxx
shown in Fig. 12, which is a very large number when treated
as positive. Thus, an integer overflow vulnerability is caused.
The test input in Fig. 11 was actually simplified from a large
test input for the ease of presentation. It was generated by apply-
ing our tree-based mutation on the two test inputs in Fig. 13 and
Fig. 14. This proof-of-concept was not generated through one
mutation, but was generated after several times of mutations.
The intermediate test inputs that triggered new coverage were
kept and added to the queue for further mutations. Eventually, it
evolved into the proof-of-concept. This vulnerability was not
triggered by AFL. This indicates that AFL’s built-in mutation
strategies is not effective in fuzzing programs that process struc-
tured inputs, where our tree-based mutation becomes effective.
H. Discussion
One threat to the validity of our evaluation is that we did not
evaluate Superion on standardized data sets such as LAVA [22]
and CGC [2]. However, many of the programs in these data sets
process unstructured inputs, or are difficult to come up with a
grammar. Therefore, we did not use them. Instead, we used four
real-life programs, whose evaluation results are representative.
Another threat is that we did not empirically compare Supe-
rion with LangFuzz [33] and IFuzzer [62], two general-purpose
grammar-aware mutation-based fuzzers. LangFuzz is not pub-
licly available, and IFuzzer lacks sufficient documentation to set
up. Instead, we compared Superion with jsfunfuzz, a successful
grammar-aware generation-based fuzzer for JavaScript engines.
One limitation of Superion is that it needs a grammar, which
limits the applicability to only publicly documented formats that
have specified grammars. Therefore, Superion may have trouble
finding proprietary grammars or undocumented extensions to
standard grammars. However, several automatic grammar infer-
ence techniques [7, 29, 34, 63] have been proposed, we plan to
integrate such techniques to have a wider applicability.
IV. RELATED WORK
Instead of listing all related work, we focus our discussion on
the most relevant fuzzing work in five aspects: guided mutation,
grammar-based mutation, block-based generation, grammar-
based generation, and fuzzing boosting.
Guided Mutation. Mutation-based fuzzing was proposed to
generate test inputs by randomly mutating well-formed test in-
puts [45]. Then, a large body of work has been developed to use
heuristics to guide mutation. AFL [71], Steelix [42], FairFuzz
[41] and CollAFL [24] use coverage to achieve the guidance,
and SlowFuzz [51] and PerfFuzz [40] further use resource usage
to realize the guidance. BuzzFuzz [25], Vuzzer [54] and Angora
[16] leverage taint analysis to identify those interesting bytes for
mutation. SAGE [27, 28], Babic´ et al. [6], Pham et al. [52] and
Badger [47] leverage symbolic execution to facilitate fuzzing.
Dowser [31], TaintScope [65] and BORG [46] integrate taint
analysis with symbolic execution to guide fuzzing. Driller [58]
combines fuzzing and concolic execution to discover deep bugs.
Karge´n and Shahmehri [37] perform mutations on the machine
code of the generating programs instead of directly on a test in-
put in order to leverage the information about the input format
encoded in the generating programs. In summary, these fuzzing
techniques target programs that process compact or unstructured
inputs, which become less effective for programs that process
structured inputs. Complementary to them, Superion can effec-
tively fuzz programs that process structured inputs.
It is worth mentioning that application-specific fuzzers have
been attracting great interests, e.g., compiler fuzzing [17, 19, 38,
39, 43, 60], kernel fuzzing [18, 32, 57], IoT (Internet of Things)
fuzzing [15], OS fuzzing [48], smart contract fuzzing [36],
GUI testing [59], and deep learning system testing [44]. It is
interesting to investigate how to extend our general-purpose
fuzzer (e.g., by designing new mutation operators or feedback
mechanisms) to be effective in fuzzing specific applications.
Grammar-Based Mutation. Several techniques have been
proposed to perform mutations based on grammar. MongoDB’s
fuzzer [30] wreaks controlled havoc on the AST of a JavaScript
test input. While our tree-based mutation is similar, Superion
conducts the mutations in an incremental way by keeping those
interesting intermediate test inputs for further fuzzing. Similarly,
µ4SQLi [5] applies a set of mutation operators on valid SQLs to
generate syntactically correct and executable SQLs that can re-
veal SQL vulnerabilities. However, both MongoDB and µ4SQLi
are specifically designed for JavaScript or SQL, and hence they
may not work for other structured inputs. Superion is general
for other structured inputs as long as their grammar is available.
LangFuzz [33] uses a grammar to separate previously failing
test input to code fragments and save them into a fragment pool.
Then, some code fragments of a test input are mutated by replac-
ing them with the same type of code fragments in the pool. Sim-
ilarly, IFuzzer [62] uses the grammar to extract code fragments
from test inputs and recomposes them in an evolutionary way.
Different from these two blackbox fuzzers, Superion brings
grammar-awareness into coverage-based greybox fuzzers.
Block-Based Generation. As some bytes in a test input are
used collectively as a single value in the program, they should
be considered together as a block during fuzzing. Following this
observation, TestMiner [20] first mines literals from a corpus of
test inputs and then queries the mined data for values suitable
for a given method under test. These predicted values are then
used as test inputs during test generation. It is not clear whether
it works well for highly-structured inputs such as JavaScript as
they experimented with simple formats such as IBAN, SQL,
E-mail and Network address. Spike [4] and Peach [3] use input
models, specifying the format of data chunks and integrity
constraints, to regard test inputs as blocks of data, and leverage
mutations to generate new test inputs. While being effective in
fuzzing programs that process weakly-structured inputs (e.g.,
images and protocols), these approaches become less effective
for highly-structured inputs (e.g., JavaScript). Complementary
to them, Superion is designed for such highly-structured inputs.
Grammar-Based Generation. Another line of work is to
use the grammar to directly generate test inputs. mangleme [72]
is an automated broken HTML generator and browser fuzzer.
jsfunfuzz [56] uses specific knowledge about past and common
vulnerabilities and hard-coded rules to generate new test inputs.
Dewey et al. [21] propose to use constraint logic programming
for program generation. Valotta [61] uses his domain knowledge
to manually build a fuzzer to test browsers. While being effec-
tive in finding vulnerabilities, they all rely on some hard-coded
or manually-specified rules to express semantic rules, which
hinder their applications to a wider audience.
Godefroid et al. [26] apply symbolic execution to generate
grammar-based constraints, and use grammar-based constraint
solver to generate test inputs. CSmith [69] iteratively and ran-
domly selects one production rule in the grammar to generate C
programs. Domato [23] generates test inputs from scratch given
the grammars that specify HTML/CSS structures and JavaScript
objects, properties and functions. Domato also fuzzed WebKit
for three months; but none of our bugs were found by Domato.
This is a strong evidence that Superion has the characteristics
that grammar-aware fuzzers without coverage feedback do not
have. Skyfire [64] and TreeFuzz [50] learn a probabilistic model
from the grammar and a corpus of test inputs to generate test
inputs. They are generation-based, while Superion is grammar-
aware mutation-based, which incrementally utilizes the inter-
esting behaviors embedded in previous interesting test inputs.
Fuzzing Boosting. Another thread of work focuses on im-
proving the efficiency of fuzzing, e.g., seed selection [55], seed
scheduling [9, 66], parameter tuning [10, 35], directed fuzzing
[8, 13, 14] to reproduce crashes or assess potential bugs found
by vulnerable code matching [11, 68], and operating primitives
[67]. These boosting techniques are orthogonal to Superion.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a grammar-aware coverage-based
greybox fuzzing approach, Superion, for programs that process
structured inputs. Specifically, we propose a grammar-aware
trimming strategy and two grammar-aware mutation strategies
to effectively trim and mutate test inputs while keeping the input
structure valid, quickly carrying the fuzzing exploration into
width and depth. Our experimental study on several XML and
JavaScript engines has demonstrated that Superion improved
code coverage and bug-finding capability over AFL. Moreover,
Superion found 31 new bugs, among which 21 new vulnera-
bilities were discovered and 16 CVEs were assigned.
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